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The Euro area busi-








At an economic growth rate of around 31/2%, the
Euro area and Western Europe as a whole
achieved the best growth performance since 1990.
But the year 2000 was exceptional. Most forecast-
ers agree that growth will be lower this year, but
views differ on how pronounced the slowdown will
be and also on the medium-term growth path of
Europe.
Current situation
The Euro area passed the cyclical peak at the mid-
dle of last year. Since then the business climate
indicator collected by the ifo institute from experts
in these countries (Economic Survey Internatio-
nal) has declined (as has the Ifo business climate
indicator for Germany) and economic growth in
the Euro area decelerated (Figures 1 and 2).
Main driving forces of the European business cycle 
There are many supply side and demand side fac-
tors which affect economic developments. In
analysing the cyclical fluctuations of the European
economy one can, however, identify a few factors
which in the past played an important role and
which will also be of key importance this year and
next.
There is, first, the growth of the global economy. It
is true that foreign trade is less important for the
Euro area as a whole than it is for its individual
member countries as a good part of their trade is
intra-Euro area trade. Nevertheless, the Euro area
is still an open economy,more open than the US or
the Japanese economies. Last year the share of
exports of goods and services of the Euro area
(excluding intra-area trade) was around 19% of
GDP compared to export shares of around 12% in
the United States and in Japan.
Another important driving force of the cyclical
development in Europe is the economic policy
stance with respect to both, fiscal policy and mon-
etary conditions.
With these three factors, i.e. world trade growth,
fiscal policy and monetary conditions (the latter
comprise interest rates and the exchange rate) one
can fairly well explain the business cycle in the
Euro area in past years, reflected in changes in the
output gap, i.e. the difference between actual GDP
and trend-GDP (Figure 3).
• The boom in the early 1990s, which was greatly
affected by German unification and expansion-
ary fiscal policy, was followed by the recession
of 1993 which was caused by a combination of
slowing world trade growth and restrictive
macro policies in Europe. Fiscal policy became
restrictive when countries started to cut back
their structural deficits which had gone out of
control. Monetary policy was tight until the
recession began because the inflation rate
exceeded the inflation target.1
• In the period between 1994 and 1999 cyclical
recoveries remained moderate and short-lived.
During the entire period governments were cut-
ting budget deficits to meet the Maastricht cri-
teria and abide by the Stability and Growth
Pact. Monetary conditions tightened in 1995
when the deutschmark (and the currencies
which were linked to it) appreciated sharply
against the dollar. World trade growth was also
unstable during this period: strong growth in
1994/95 helped Europe to recover from the
recession. The temporary slowdowns in the
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1 But during the recession in 1993 the Bundesbank reduced the dis-
count rate in five steps from 8% in February to 53/4% in October.expansion of world trade in 1996 and in 1999
dampened growth in Europe.
• In the year 2000 there was a combination of
booming world trade and very favourable mon-
etary conditions which were also a result of the
weak euro. These two positive factors out-
weighed the higher oil prices so that economic
growth could reach a new peak.
Forecast for 2001 and 2002
The Ifo indicators (as well as other indicators) for
the global economy show a significant slowdown in
economic activity in all major regions of the world
with the biggest decline in the United States
(Figure 4). Obviously Europe cannot be insulated
from the slowdown in the United States and in the
world economy.Given the sharp decline of some of
the indicators one cannot preclude a hard landing
scenario for both the United States and Europe,
although this is not our most likely forecast.A hard
landing scenario for Europe would require:
• that the United States enter a recession and that
this will be accompanied by 
• significant losses in confidence all over the
world including Europe, and 
• a fall in the exchange rate of the dollar and a
sharp appreciation of the euro.
In such a pessimistic scenario, growth in Western
Europe would decline from 3.4% last year to
around 11/2% this year. In the United States,
growth would decline from 5% last year to around
1% or lower this year. There are various reasons
why this is not our most likely forecast. First, there
are good chances that the slowdown of the US
economy will remain moderate, in particular as
monetary policy was eased quickly and may be
eased further. In addition, in Europe macroeco-
nomic policies are currently better suited to pre-
vent a severe downturn than in past recessions.
• Fiscal policy will stimulate demand in 2001
because of tax-cutting programmes in some
countries like Germany, France, and the
Netherlands (Figure 5). Furthermore, as the
average budget deficit in the Euro area is now
relatively small (Figure 6), there is room for an
increase in the cyclical component of the deficit
in case of a more severe downturn without vio-
lating the 3% deficit ceiling. Such an increase in
the deficit (if tolerated by the policymakers)
would then provide an automatic stabiliser
effect. By contrast, during past slowdowns (like
that of 1993) European fiscal policy often
restrained aggregate demand.
• With the increases in interest rates last year the
European Central Bank tightened monetary con-
ditions in the Euro area. The level of the mone-
tary conditions index constructed by Ifo for the
Euro area by weighting together the real short-
term interest rate and the real effective exchange
rate of the euro is, however, still above its medi-
um-term average. This implies that monetary
conditions are currently not restraining aggre-
gate demand. But a further appreciation of the
euro would continue to depress the monetary
conditions index unless the ECB cuts interest
rates (Figure 7). The growth of the money stock
M3 has decelerated from a high rate and is now
close to the reference value (41/2%) which
reflects a neutral policy stance. By contrast, the
monetary policy stance (excluding the exchange
rate) is found to be restrictive if instead it is
assessed by the Taylor rate and assuming that the
ECB is currently aiming to keep the core infla-
tion rate below 2% rather than to push the actu-
al inflation rate below 2% which is currently
above this target because of the oil price effect
(Figure 8). The yield gap, i.e. the difference
between long and short-term interest rates, also
indicates a tight monetary policy stance. In our
forecast we have assumed that the ECB will cut
interest rates by 50 basis points this year and that
the euro will strengthen from currently 0.91 to
around 0.97 dollars towards the end of the year.
• The actual inflation rate is still above the ECB
target but this is due to the oil price increase
which we assume to have been temporary.
Headline inflation has come down somewhat but
core inflation has picked up. One reason is the
effect of higher oil prices on the cost of domestic
production. As we assume no further rise in oil
prices, this second round effect should also be
temporary. Most recently European food prices
have increased in the wake of the spreading
mad-cow disease, but this should also be tempo-
rary. The big question, however, is if and how
wages in the Euro area will respond to higher
headline inflation. So far wage increases have
been moderate and in many cases they have a
term of two years.Hence next year’s wage round
will be of key importance for the sustainability







Growth of Euro area
GDP projected to
accelerate in the
first half of 2001, but
to be lower than in
2000
risk of higher wages and increased inflation
expectations perceived by the ECB, the more
(the less) it will hesitate to cut interest rates.
Based on these assumptions on the global econo-
my and on macro policies we expect (see Table 1)
that in the Euro area
• exports will increase by 71/2% this year and next
year (the major slowdown in export growth
occurring in the first half of the year) (broadly
in line with the growth of world trade), follow-
ing a 11.7% expansion last year;
• growth of fixed investment (equipment and con-
struction) will decelerate from 43/4% last year to
33/4% this year and 4% next year;
• private consumption will increase by around
21/2% this year and next. In view of the fact that
taxes are being cut in major countries, this
rather conservative outlook may be surprising.
It follows from a low starting base due to the
negative oil price effect and the assumption of a
recovery of consumer spending during the
course of this year.
• GDP growth in the Euro area will – after a
deceleration in the second half of last year –
accelerate during the first half of this year,
mainly driven by consumption.At average rates
of around 21/2% this year and next, growth will
be lower than last year and similar to that
achieved in 1999 and also similar to the rate of
potential (or trend) output.
• As the slowdown will be more pronounced in
the United States (13/4%), economic growth in
the Euro area (and also in Western Europe as a
whole) will be higher than in the U.S. The
United States is,however,assumed to recover in
2002 when it may again achieve slightly higher
growth than Europe. In the forecasting period
there will be no growth differential in favour of
the United States which is an important differ-
ence to the second half of the last decade
(Figure 9).
• Employment in the Euro area will continue to
rise and unemployment will fall to under 8%
next year. Compared to a peak unemployment
rate of almost 12% this may be considered an
achievement. However, while it takes only a
short time in Europe to increase unemployment
during a recession it takes a very long time to
reduce it to its pre-recession level (Figure 10).
This points to major structural rigidities in
European labour markets which differ, howev-
er, among the various countries. Furthermore,
some European countries have made more
progress to reduce structural unemployment
than others.
Medium-term outlook
There is a good chance that the growth path in
Europe will be higher than it has been in the past.
Several reasons may be put forward:
• Given fewer fiscal problems and lower inflation,
both fiscal policy and monetary policy could be
less restrictive than they have been in the sec-
ond half of the 1990s.
• Structural reforms in product and labour mar-
kets could make the European economy more
dynamic. There are clear signs for such effects
already. But structural reforms in labour mar-
kets are still lagging in particular in the large
continental European countries.
• The spread of new economy effects could also
help Europe achieve a higher medium-term
growth path. But some caution is in order here.
First, measuring any new economy effects is not




1999 2000 2001 2002
(*) (*) (s) (s)
Percentage change over previous year
a)
Private consumption 2.8 2.6 21/ 4  21/ 4 
Government consumption 1.6 1.6 11/ 2  11/ 4 
Gross fixed capital formation 5.3 4.6 31/ 2  4
Domestic expenditure 3.1 2.8 21/ 4  21/ 2 
Exports 4.7 11.7 71/ 2  71/ 2 
Imports 6.7 10.4 7 71/ 2 
Gross domestic product (GDP) 2.5 3.4 21/ 2  21/ 2 
Employment
b)
(% change over previous year) 1.8 2.0 11/ 4  11/ 4 
Unemployment rate
c) (in %) 10.0 9.1 81/ 2  73/ 4 
Consumer prices
d)
(% change over previous year) 1.1 2.3 31/ 4  13/ 4 
Public sector financial deficit
e)
– in % of GDP – 1.3 0.3 – 3/ 4  – 1/ 2 
memo item:
Real GDP in USA
(% change over previous year) 4.2 5.0 13/ 4  23/ 4 
Real GDP in Japan
(% change over previous year) 0.8 1.7 1 11/ 2 
* Preliminary. – (s) Forecast by the Ifo Institute. – 
a) At 1995 prices. –
b) Domestic employment. – 
c) Unemployment as a percentage of ci-
vilian labour force (employed and unemployed). – 
d) Harmonised
index of consumer prices (HICP). – 
e) On national accounts defi-
nition (ESA 1995), in 2000 including revenue from the auction of
UMTS licenses.
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Economic and Social Research
Institute, European Central Bank, Eurostat, calculations by the Ifo
Institute.porary cyclical effects from overall productivity
growth to find the rate of growth which is sus-
tainable over the medium and longer term. So
far no significant new economy effects can be
detected in overall growth and in productivity
growth in Western Europe (as officially mea-
sured). But in a few European countries like
Finland and Ireland such effects are noticeable
(Table 2).
• Further integration of Europe could also pro-
vide positive effects on medium-term European
growth. Here much will again depend on how








Determinants of Growth 1990–1999
Comparison between the United States and Europe
a)
Change in productivity 
caused by:
GDP Labour Capital Labour Capital
input stock productivity deepening TFP
United States
1990–1995 2.4 1.4 1.9 1.0 0.2 0.9
1996–1999 4.4 2.1 3.7 2.3 0.5 1.8
1990–1999 3.4 1.8 2.8 1.7 0.4 1.4
Western Europe
b)
1990–1995 1.4 – 0.4 2.3 1.9 1.0 0.9
1996–1999 2.2 0.9 2.2 1.3 0.5 0.8




1996–1999 5.5 2.3 0.9 3.1 – 0.5 3.7
Ireland
1996–1999 9.9 5.8 4.7 4.0 – 0.4 4.5
a) Average annual percentage change, in constant prices. – 
b) Weighted average of follow-
ing countries: Germany (1992–95, 1996–99), Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands,
Norway, Sweden, Spain, United Kingdom.
Source: C. Gust and J. Marquez, Productivity Developments Abroad 
(http.//www.federalreserve.gov) and own calculations.
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